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Elizabeth C. Rosen†††† & Sofie Syed††††† 
 
When Executive Order 137691 issued and the legal challenges 
against it began, the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality 
submitted amicus briefs in cases around the country. In doing this work, 
the Center was also mindful that advocacy should not be limited to the 
arena of courts, but must also include community organizing to build 
coalitions and public education in order to bring about durable change. 
The amicus briefs served as a core part of a broader advocacy strategy. 
Fortunately, the Korematsu Center was able to draw on its resources, 
 
†  Professor of Law and Executive Director, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality, Seattle University School of Law. I’d like to thank the pro 
bono team at Akin Gump for their unflagging dedication to support the 
Korematsu Center in its advocacy efforts with regard to the various 
iterations of the travel ban. In the first phase of the litigation, this included 
pulling together attorneys from its offices around the country on Super Bowl 
Sunday to file what would be the first of many amicus briefs on this issue. 
Two days earlier, Judge James L. Robart issued a nationwide temporary 
restraining order against portions of the travel ban on Feb. 3, 2017, 
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-cv-0141 (JLR), and expedited briefing before 
the Ninth Circuit required amicus briefs to be filed by midnight on Feb. 5, 
2017. This story is told more fully below. 
††  Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. In addition to all of our 
Akin Gump colleagues specifically named in the text of this note, I would 
like to thank our Supreme Court specialists Pratik A. Shah and Martine 
Cicconi; Jessica Weisel of our California appellate group; and Elizabeth 
Atkins, Nathaniel Botwinick, Kareen Ejoh, Jorge Guzman, Adria Hicks, 
Beth Kasden, Abigail Kohlman, Jennifer Langmack, Harry Larson, Jeff 
Mutterperl, Daniella Roseman, Risa Slavin, Sangita Sahasranaman, Steven 
Schulman, and James Tysse. 
†††  Partner, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. 
††††  Associate, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. 
††††† J.D., Columbia Law School. 
1. Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
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including the Civil Rights Clinic at Seattle University School of Law, a 
team of pro bono attorneys at Akin Gump, and, as the travel ban chal-
lenges progressed, members of the legal teams that had represented 
Gordon Hirabayashi, Fred Korematsu, and Minoru Yasui in the suc-
cessful efforts in the 1980s to overturn the wartime criminal convictions 
of those men.2 As the cases progressed, a number of civil rights organi-
zations and bar associations joined the effort. 
The final amicus curiae brief reprinted below was the culmination 
of more than a year of work in opposition to the Trump Administra-
tion’s various iterations of the Muslim travel and refugee ban. Readers 
may find it interesting and useful to learn how the coalition developed 
and how their work evolved. We begin with that narrative, and then 
follow it with the specific advocacy strategy behind the amicus brief. 
I. The Story Behind the Amicus Brief 
The first sparks of this brief came together soon after President 
Donald J. Trump issued the first iteration of the Muslim ban on 
January 27, 2017.3 In the travel ban and the legal arguments advanced 
by the Department of Justice in support of it, the Korematsu Center 
saw echoes of the past, echoes of shameful legal precedents that had 
permitted the exclusion of immigrants based on race and nationality 
and the mass incarceration of Japanese Americans during World War 
II. The government’s invocation of the “plenary power doctrine,” that 
the President has “unreviewable authority” in matters of immigration, 
has its roots in blatantly racist cases from the late 19th century, such as 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States.4 The government’s invocation of 
national security to shield the President’s wide-sweeping ban from 
 
2. Each man’s criminal convictions were upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943); Yasui v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 115, 117 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
224 (1944). Decades later, the convictions of Gordon Hirabyashi and Fred 
Korematsu were overturned in proceedings seeking a writ of coram nobis. 
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th Cir. 1987); 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984). 
Minoru Yasui’s conviction was vacated by the U.S. District Court for Oregon 
but the court refused to reach Yasui’s constitutional challenge, and during 
the pendency of Yasui’s appeal of that decision, Yasui passed away. Yasui 
v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496, 1499-1500 (9th Cir. 1985); Minoru Yasui 
(1916-1986), The Oregon History Project, https://oregonhistory 
project.org/articles/biographies/minoru-yasui-biography/#.WuCQU9Pwb 
OQ [https://perma.cc/5SE4-53XA] (last visited Apr. 25, 2018). For a recent 
account that examines what led to the overturning of these convictions, 
focusing on Korematsu, see Lorraine K. Bannai, Enduring Conviction: 
Fred Korematsu and His Quest for Justice (2015). 
3. See Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017). 
4. 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
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meaningful judicial scrutiny harkens back to World War II, when the 
Supreme Court chose to defer to the Executive branch and the military 
with regard to the removal and incarceration of more than 110,000 
Japanese Americans from the West Coast states.5 The Korematsu Cen-
ter contemplated an amicus brief that would remind courts of this 
history as part of an effort to keep our country from repeating its mis-
takes. The Center saw this as an opportunity for a course correction in 
our constitutional jurisprudence as it related to immigration and na-
tional security.6 
Meanwhile, Elizabeth Rosen and Sofie Syed, associates at Akin 
Gump, were among the hundreds of lawyers who swarmed John F. 
Kennedy International Airport the day after the first Executive Order, 
to protest and to volunteer their services to inbound travelers from the 
countries named in the order. Syed was mentioned in a Rolling Stone 
article published online that weekend. 7 Alice Hsu, a corporate partner 
at Akin Gump and a mentor and friend of Syed, called Robert Chang, 
the Korematsu Center’s Executive Director, to catch up on news of the 
travel ban and the legal challenges that had been filed immediately in 
multiple courts, and to tell him that Syed had been featured in Rolling 
Stone.8 Hsu had worked for Chang as a research assistant while she was 
a law student at Loyola Law School,9 and they had recently reconnected 
at a bar association conference. That reconnection led to Hsu—despite 
her corporate practice specialty—leading and managing a team of Akin 
Gump litigators, including Syed, in writing an amicus curiae brief to 
 
5. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
6. See generally Robert S. Chang, Whitewashing Precedent: From The Chinese 
Exclusion Case to Korematsu to the Muslim Travel Ban Cases, 68 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 1183 (2018) (discussing immigration exceptionalism and 
national security exceptionalism as deformities in U.S. constitutional 
jurisprudence). 
7. John Knefel, Inside the Huge JFK Airport Protest Over Trump’s Muslim 
Ban, Rolling Stone (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/ 
politics/features/inside-the-huge-jfk-airport-protest-over-trumps-muslim-ban-
w463615 [https://perma.cc/DSF6-GHG7]. 
8. The call also was precipitated by a Google doodle. When Syed told Hsu 
about Rolling Stone, it was Monday, January 30, 2017. Hsu went to Google 
to look up the article, and noted that the featured Google doodle of the day 
was Fred Korematsu, whose birthday is commemorated on that day by 
several states and municipalities. Fred Korematsu’s 98th Birthday, Google 
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.google.com/doodles/fred-korematsus-98th-
birthday [https://perma.cc/2VR5-8J8]. 
9. Hsu did research for Chang’s first book, Robert Chang, Disoriented: 
Asian Americans, Law, and the Nation-State (1999), which included 
discussions of the plenary power doctrine and treatment of different Asian 
American immigrant groups in U.S. history. 
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New York’s high court for the Korematsu Center in 2016.10 That case, 
People v. Bridgeforth,11 involved jury selection in which the prosecution 
repeatedly struck potential jurors who were dark-skinned women. The 
question was whether discrimination in jury selection based on skin 
color—as opposed to race—was subject to Batson12 challenges.13 The 
amicus brief, in which the Korematsu Center was joined by a host of 
civil rights organizations, bar associations, and law professors, was filed 
in October 2016, and Hsu was instrumental in assembling the group of 
amici. And in late December 2016, the New York Court of Appeals had 
ruled that such skin color discrimination in jury selection was imper-
missible.14 Though the court did not cite directly to the amicus brief in 
its opinion, it cited to two studies that the amicus brief brought to the 
attention of the court.15 
So when Hsu called Chang just a few weeks after the successful 
outcome in Bridgeforth to tell him about Syed’s and Rosen’s volunteer 
work at JFK, Chang asked if Akin Gump would be interested in work-
ing on amicus briefs to be filed in the travel ban cases, and the firm 
was quickly retained. Among the litigators who Hsu asked to join the 
team was Robert Johnson, a New York commercial litigator who hap-
pened to be already admitted to the Eastern District of Michigan—one 
of the courts in which plaintiffs challenged the first executive order. 
The early strategy was to file amicus briefs in as many district court 
challenges as possible,16 and if one of the quickly-moving litigations was 
 
10. Brief for Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et 
al. in Support of Defendant-Appellant, People v. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d 611 
(2016) (No. 2012-07683) [hereinafter Bridgeforth Brief]. 
11. 69 N.E.3d 611 (2016). 
12. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
13. Bridgeforth, 69 N.E.3d at 614. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. (citing Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Law of Skin Color, 49 Duke 
L.J. 1487 (2000); Michael Hughes & Bradley R. Hertel, The Significance of 
Color Remains: A Study of Life Chances, Mate Selection, and Ethnic 
Consciousness Among Black Americans, 68 Soc. Forces 1105 (1990)); 
Bridgeforth Brief, supra note 10. 
16. Because of the uncertain pace of the various legal proceedings and 
uncertainty with regard to outcomes before particular judges or before 
particular appellate panels, the legal team thought it important to 
participate in as many of the cases as it could. In several cases, especially 
the ones involving States as plaintiffs challenging the executive order, many 
amicus briefs were filed. In two, the Korematsu Center filed the only amicus 
briefs. See Brief of Amici Curiae of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law 
and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Arab American Civil Rights 
League v. Trump, No. 17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2017); Brief of the 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici Curiae in 
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pending in that district, it would require counsel admitted in that dis-
trict. The team planned to file motions for admission pro hac vice where 
necessary, but with multiple filings to be done in a short period of time, 
finding counsel already admitted and ready to join the team was an 
advantage. 
Over the next four days, while Chang and the Akin Gump team 
developed their arguments and began drafting, the travel ban litigation 
moved quickly in courts around the country. On Friday evening, 
February 3, 2017, Judge James Robart in Seattle issued a temporary 
restraining order, nationally enjoining enforcement of the travel ban.17 
The government appealed on Saturday, February 4, and filed an emer-
gency motion for a stay pending appeal. That same day, the Ninth 
Circuit ordered that the challengers file their opposition papers by 
Sunday, February 5, at 11:59 p.m. PST; that the government file its 
reply papers by Monday, February 6; and that oral argument would be 
held February 7.18 Accordingly, on a Sunday morning conference call, 
the Korematsu Center and Akin Gump teams decided that it would be 
necessary to finish the brief in a matter of hours and file it before mid-
night. While much of the nation was absorbed by the Super Bowl that 
day, the amicus team was busy finalizing the brief, obtaining consent 
of the parties to file the brief, proofreading and cite-checking.19 
In rapid succession, the team refined and improved the brief, and 
filed it in multiple district courts.20 By mid-February, Jay Hirabayashi, 
 
Support of Plaintiffs, Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-00786 (C.D. 
Cal. Feb. 8, 2017). 
17. Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. 
Feb 3, 2017). 
18. See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158 (9th Cir. 2017). 
19. Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees and Affirmance, Washington v. 
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105). A further complication 
arose that day when it was realized that the Ninth Circuit’s electronic filing 
system is closed for routine maintenance every Sunday evening from 10:00 
p.m. until midnight. The Akin Gump team decided to file before 10:00 p.m. 
rather than risk a late filing. Mid-day, the Ninth Circuit clerk’s office 
apparently realized that the maintenance would interfere with the scheduled 
deadline, and an order was entered extending the filing deadline to 1:00 a.m. 
Only two amicus briefs were filed before 10:00pm when the electronic filing 
system shut down for maintenance. The Korematsu Center amicus brief was 
one of them. After midnight and before the 1:00am deadline, many more 
amicus briefs were filed. 
20. Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Mohammed v. United States, No. 2:17-cv-
00786 (C.D. Calif. Feb. 8, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae by the Fred T. 
Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Arab 
American Civil Rights League v. Trump, No. 17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 
9, 2017); Brief of the Amici Curiae Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, Aziz v. Trump, No. 17-cv-116 (E.D. 
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Holly Yasui, and Karen Korematsu—the children of Gordon 
Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu—had signed on as 
amici as well. More than a decade before, Hirabayashi, Yasui, and 
Korematsu had filed an amicus brief in Turkmen v. Ashcroft,21 chal-
lenging the detention of Arab and Muslim men after September 11, 
2001, represented by Akin Gump partner Robert H. Pees.22 In Turkmen, 
as in the current travel ban litigation, the amici drew parallels between 
the U.S. government’s use of executive power to target Japanese Ameri-
cans during World War II and Muslims after September 11.23 
In March, the President issued Executive Order 1378024 (“EO-2”), 
superseding the first travel ban, and the process began anew. The ami-
cus team updated its brief and filed again in district courts25 and in the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.26 In June, the government 
filed petitions for certiorari in the Supreme Court and applications for 
a stay pending appeal; on June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court issued an 
order narrowing the scope of the injunctions and granting certiorari.27 
The amicus team was now headed to the Supreme Court, with its brief 
due in mid-September. 
The opportunity for the coram nobis teams—including the indi-
vidual amici—to file a brief in the Supreme Court was momentous. As 
 
Va. Feb. 9, 2017) Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and 
Equality et al. in Support of the Relief Sought by Petitioners and Intervenor-
Plaintiff, Darweesh v. Trump, No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 388504 
(E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2017). 
21. 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009). 
22. Brief of Karen Korematsu-Haigh et al., Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542 
(2d Cir. 2009) (Nos. 06–3745–cv(L); 06–3785–cv(Con); 06–3789–cv(Con); 
06–3800–cv(Con); 06–4187–cv (XAP)) [hereinafter Turkmen Brief]; see Nina 
Bernstein, Relatives of Interned Japanese-Americans Side with Muslims, 
N.Y. Times (Apr. 3, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/ny 
region/03detain.html [https://perma.cc/5H87-Y5EA]. 
23. The Turkmen Brief, supra note 22, was filed in 2007 in the Second Circuit; 
since then, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, remanded, and 
continues to be litigated on remand to the Eastern District of New York. See 
Turkmen v. Ashcroft, Ctr. for Const. Rts., https://ccrjustice.org/ziglar-
v-abbasi [https://perma.cc/Y2P5-UJHM] (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
24. Exec. Order No. 13780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). 
25. Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs, Hawai’i v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-0050 (D. 
Haw. Mar. 10, 2017); Brief of Amici Curiae of the Fred T. Korematsu Center 
for Law and Equality et al. in Support of Plaintiffs, supra note 16. 
26. Amici Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al., 
Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (No. 
17-1351); Brief of the Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et 
al., Hawai’i v. Trump, 871 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-15589). 
27. Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017). 
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noted above,28 the Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu decisions of the 
Supreme Court in 1943 and 1944 had never been reversed, although 
they had been widely condemned. The coram nobis teams decided to 
convene an all-hands meeting to discuss exactly what the amicus brief 
should say to the court that had upheld the criminal convictions during 
World War II. The meeting took place in late July in San Francisco, at 
the offices of Minami Tamaki LLP, and Johnson attended on behalf of 
Akin Gump. For the coram nobis teams, it was a reunion as well as a 
planning session; for Johnson, it was a meaningful opportunity to hear 
first-hand about the coram nobis cases and the legal, political, 
educational, and artistic work the teams had done over the years to 
preserve the legacies of these men and their Supreme Court cases. 
Attendees included Holly Yasui, a documentary filmmaker who was 
then editing a film about her father;29 Jay Hirabayashi, a dancer and 
choreographer who has created works inspired by his father’s 
imprisonment;30 and Karen Korematsu, the founder and executive 
director of the Korematsu Institute and a frequent speaker on the 
Japanese American incarceration.31 Also participating were Peter Irons, 
the legal historian who, along with Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, discovered 
that the government had suppressed and altered evidence during World 
War II,32 and Professor Eric Yamamoto, who was busy editing a new 
book linking the Japanese American incarceration with the civil liber-
ties issues of today.33 The coram nobis attorneys—many of whom ap-
peared as counsel on the Supreme Court amicus brief—included Dale 
Minami, Don Tamaki, Lori Bannai, Peggy Nagae, Bob Rusky, Karen 
Kai, Rod Kawakami, and Leigh-Ann Miyasato. 
 
28. See supra note 2. 
29. See Never Give Up! Minoru Yasui and the Fight for Justice (2017). 
For more information about the film, see Never Give Up! Minoru Yasui 
and the Fight for Justice, http://www.minoruyasuifilm.org [https:// 
perma.cc/H7DT-FXK8] (last visited May 9, 2018). 
30. See Kokoro Dance, www.kokoro.ca [https://perma.cc/WC58-MLG9]; 
Kokoro Dance: Heart, Soul & Spirit, Bulletin (Nov. 1, 2015), http:// 
jccabulletin-geppo.ca/kokoro-dance-heart-soul-spirit/ [https://perma.cc/K7 
34-XHQJ]. 
31. See Fred T. Korematsu Inst., http://www.korematsuinstitute.org/home 
page/ [https://perma.cc/2YAM-TPDW] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
32. See generally Peter H. Irons, Justice At War: The Story of the 
Japanese American Internment Cases (1983); Bannai, supra note 2, at 
137–49. 
33. Eric Y. Yamamoto, In the Shadow of Korematsu: Democratic 
Liberties and National Security (2018). Yamamoto is also the Fred T. 
Korematsu Professor of Law and Social Justice at the Richardson School of 
Law, University of Hawai’i. 
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After considerable debate and careful drafting, the team proudly 
filed the amicus brief in the Supreme Court on September 18, 2017.34 It 
was then rather frustrating when the President issued Proclamation 
964535 (“EO-3”) on September 24, superseding EO-2, which led to the 
Supreme Court dismissal of the appeal as moot.36 The International 
Refugee Assistance Project (“IRAP”) and Hawai’i litigants returned to 
their district courts to begin new challenges; at the request of their 
counsel, we did not file amicus briefs at the district court level but in-
stead filed when their challenges reached the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, 
respectively.37 
The brief reprinted here, filed in the Supreme Court on March 30, 
2018, was thus the thirteenth iteration of the brief. We added a third 
major point, drawing attention to the government’s litigation strategy 
today, including its reliance on a memorandum from the Department 
of Homeland Security while it “has gone to great lengths to shield that 
report from view.”38 We draw parallels between the government’s refus-
al to produce the report underlying the Proclamation and the suppres-
sion of evidence during World War II.39 
II. The Broader Advocacy Strategy Behind the Amicus 
Brief 
The Korematsu Center files amicus briefs with several goals in 
mind, the most immediate of which is to have an impact on the litiga-
tion. In addition, the Center sees amicus briefs as serving a democra-
tizing function, allowing additional voices to be heard. Amicus briefs 
can also involve sign-on strategies that create opportunities for com-
munity engagement and coalition building. Finally, amicus briefs can 
serve an important educational function.40 The Akin Gump team was 
 
34. Brief of Karen Korematsu et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017) (Nos. 16-1436, 16-1540). 
35. Proclamation No. 9645. 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017). 
36. Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 377 (2017). 
37. Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 883 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 2018) (Nos. 17-2231, No. 17-2232, No. 17-
2233, No. 17-2240); Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Hawai’i v. 
Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-17168). 
38. See infra at 1256. 
39. Id. at 1257; see also Akin Gump Again Serves as Lead Pro Bono Counsel 
on U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Brief in Travel Ban Litigation, Akin Gump 
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www. 
akingump.com/en/news-insights/akin-gump-again-serves-as-lead-pro-bono-
counsel-on-u-s-supreme.html [https://perma.cc/Q6YE-QSAH]. 
40. For more on the Korematsu Center’s Civil Rights Amicus Project and how 
amicus work fits into a broader theory of social change, see Robert S. Chang, 
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familiar with the Korematsu Center’s advocacy strategy because of its 
previous collaboration in the New York juror discrimination case.41 
A. Litigation Impact 
Empirical research on the impact of amicus briefs is limited and 
tends to focus on the U.S. Supreme Court.42 Evidence of impact can be 
seen most directly if an opinion cites to an amicus brief, adopts an argu-
ment it advances that is different from ones advanced by the parties, 
or explicitly considers contextual information that it provides. In the 
absence of a direct citation, it is difficult to discern whether and in what 
way amicus filings are making a difference. However, a recent survey of 
federal district and circuit court judges and Supreme Court justices 
indicates that amicus briefs are considered seriously by judges and jus-
tices and have an impact.43 
Scholars typically hypothesize that impact arises based on the “af-
fected groups hypothesis” or the “information hypothesis.”44 Under the 
“affected groups hypothesis,” “amicus briefs are efficacious because they 
signal to the Court that a wide variety of outsiders to the suit will be 
affected by the Court’s decision.”45 The “information hypothesis” holds 
that “amicus briefs are effective, not because they signal how many af-
fected groups will be impacted by the decision, but because they provide 
litigants with additional social scientific, legal, or political information 
supporting their arguments.”46 The Korematsu Center’s experience and 
intuition is that both hypotheses work together in combination, so that 
it matters both who is speaking as well as what they have to say. 
In the early stages of the travel ban litigation, the parties and 
judges did not mention Korematsu or the other Japanese American 
WWII incarceration cases. We kept filing amicus briefs in cases around 
the country and speaking with reporters, insisting that the wartime 
Japanese American incarceration cases were relevant, even if the parties 
 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality and Its Vision for 
Social Change, 7 Stan. J. C.R. & C.L. 197, 200–07 (2011). 
41. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
42. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen & Neal Devins, The Amicus Machine, 102 Va. 
L. Rev. 1901 (2016); Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining 
the Influence of Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court 
Litigation, 38 Law & Soc’y Rev. 807 (2004); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743 (2000). 
43. See generally Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae 
in Federal Court: A Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 
27 Rev. Litig. 669 (2008). 
44. Collins, supra note 42, at 808–09. 
45. Id. at 808. 
46. Id. 
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were not addressing the cases as such. This changed in the appellate 
proceedings with regard to EO-2. In the Fourth Circuit, during the en 
banc oral argument, Judge James A. Wynn, Jr., mused aloud about 
Korematsu:  
[I]f we follow that line of reasoning, would we think differently 
about Korematsu now? . . . If you don’t lock them all up, and 
something bad happens, oh, then it’s on the President. If you do, 
you violate law. If we follow that, is that, does that follow in 
every other thing we do? 47 
Counsel for IRAP seemed to misunderstand Judge Wynn’s question 
and conceded, unnecessarily, that we must defer if the President invokes 
a national security rationale and failed to address Korematsu.48 
Nevertheless, Korematsu was discussed by Judge Wynn in his con-
curring opinion.49 In addition, the en banc opinion authored by Chief 
Judge Roger L. Gregory noted: 
Here and elsewhere, the Government would have us end our 
inquiry without scrutinizing either Section 2(c)’s stated purpose 
or the Government’s asserted interests, but “unconditional 
deference to a government agent’s invocation of 
‘emergency’ . . . has a lamentable place in our history,” 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Ass’n of New York v. City of New York, 
310 F.3d 43, 53–54 (2d. Cir. 2002) (citing Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 223, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L. Ed. 194 (1944)), 
and is incompatible with our duty to evaluate the evidence before 
us.50 
Then, in the Ninth Circuit proceedings on EO-2, Judge Richard A. 
Paez mentioned the Korematsu Center amicus brief and asked directly 
of Acting Solicitor Jeffrey Wall, “Would the Korematsu executive order 
pass muster under your test today?”51 Though Wall did not directly 
 
47. Oral Argument at 1:50:38 to 1:51:03, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. 
Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No. 17-1351), http:// 
coop.ca4.uscourts.gov/OAarchive/mp3/17-1351-20170508.mp3. 
48. Id. 
49. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 612, 619 (4th Cir. 
2017) (Wynn, J., concurring) (arguing that we have learned from Dred Scott 
and Korematsu and rejecting a national security basis founded on actions of 
individuals or even groups of individuals then attributed to all persons who 
share a particular race, ethnicity, or national origin), vacated as moot, 138 
S. Ct. 353 (2017). 
50. Id. at 603. 
51. Oral Argument at 23:55, State of Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 
2017) (No. 17-17168), https://www.c-span.org/video/?427827-1/ninth-circuit-
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answer the question, hearing this exchange was a gratifying moment 
that made us feel that we had been heard and that the arguments and 
contextual information we were providing were being taken seriously 
and having an impact. 
B. Democratizing the Courts 
Because litigation involving civil rights will often impact many 
beyond the immediate parties, seeking to advance or protect civil rights 
in the courts is decidedly un- or anti-democratic. Because amicus briefs 
allow for non-parties to be heard, amicus briefs can serve an important 
democratizing function.52 Our first amicus filing, in the Ninth Circuit, 
did not include other amici. But, as noted above, we quickly reached 
out to the families of the three men whose cases had reached the Su-
preme Court during World War II. Though each of the men’s con-
victions were vacated four decades later, none got the full measure of 
relief of having a modern day court assess the constitutionality of the 
government’s World War II treatment of Japanese Americans. A repre-
sentative of each family quickly joined as amici on our briefs. In addi-
tion, members of the legal teams who had successfully challenged the 
men’s wartime criminal convictions joined the effort, helping to ensure 
that the perspectives and voices of the three men and their respective 
legacies would be fully represented. 
Mindful that other individuals and groups might want to have a 
voice in this litigation, the Korematsu Center also reached out to na-
tional civil rights organizations and national bar associations of color. 
We thought that they would see the travel ban—though primarily 
impacting people from several majority-Muslim nations—as an issue 
that affects their members and impacts many more communities, espe-
cially if disparate treatment on the basis of religion and nationality in 
the immigration sphere based on the specter of national security was 
legalized or determined to be constitutionally permissible. We found 
this to be the case, and soon, we were joined by the following civil rights 
organizations and national bar associations of color: Asian Americans 
Advancing Justice; Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund; 
Hispanic National Bar Association; LatinoJustice PRLDEF; National 
Bar Association; National Asian Pacific American Bar Association; 
National Native American Bar Association; and South Asian Bar 
Association of North America. 
These organizations chose to become part of the “who” that was 
speaking the “what” in our amicus brief. Their motivations to join likely 
 
hears-oral-argument-travel-ban&live&start=1403 [https://perma.cc/U4UV-
ZCUM]. 
52. See generally Robert S. Chang & Karin Wang, Democratizing the Courts: 
How an Amicus Brief Helped Organize the Asian American Community to 
Support Marriage Equality, 14 Asian Pac. Am. L.J. 22 (2008). 
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varied, but their participation was consistent with the Korematsu 
Center’s vision about the way in which amicus briefs can serve a de-
mocratizing function with regard to the courts. 
Who joined as amici was somewhat fluid, with some groups joining 
early but then dropping off or drafting and filing their own amicus 
briefs.53 In addition, local groups sometimes joined cases in particular 
jurisdictions. For example, the Hawaii chapter of the Japanese Ameri-
can Citizens League joined as amicus in Hawaii v. Trump;54 the 
Michigan Asian Pacific American Bar Association joined in Arab 
American Civil Rights League v. Trump;55 and the Asian American Bar 
Association of New York joined in Darweesh v. Trump.56 The sign-on 
strategy served the function of democratizing the courts by allowing 
amici to have a voice in litigation in which they felt deeply invested in 
the outcome. 
The sign-on strategy also served the additional goal with regard to 
a political dimension that extends beyond the amicus filings as dis-
cussed in the next section. 
C. Community Engagement and Coalition Building 
When the Korematsu Center approached the leaders of civil rights 
organizations and national bar associations of color, it did so as part of 
its broader strategy of engaging those organizations and their constit-
uencies to build coalitions to facilitate social change. The Korematsu 
Center consistently engages in this practice to foster sustaining relation-
ships that persist beyond any particular amicus effort. This also requires 
reciprocity so that lawyers and civil rights organizations do not repeat 
mistakes made by earlier civil rights lawyers. Gerald Lopez recounts a 
story of growing up in East Los Angeles and watching civil rights law-
yers come into his community and direct community members about 
what the community’s priorities ought to be and what the community 
members needed to be doing.57 Instead, durable coalitions require rela-
tionships built on respect and reciprocity that fosters trust. The 
 
53. As the litigation progressed, the National Asian Pacific American Bar 
Association began filing its own amicus brief in the travel ban cases, and the 
National Native American Bar Association chose to no longer participate as 
amicus. 
54. 878 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2017), Amici Brief of Karen Korematsu et al., Hawai’i 
v. Trump, supra note 37. 
55. No. 2:17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich. May 18, 2017), Brief of Amici Curiae of the 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of 
Plaintiffs, supra note 16. 
56. No. 1:17-cv-00480, 2017 WL 388504 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2017); Brief of the 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality et al. in Support of the 
Relief Sought by Petitioners and Intervenor-Plaintiff, supra note 20. 
57. Gerald Lopez, Rebellious Lawyering 1 (1992). 
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coalitions fostered in this process can then join together to advocate in 
other arenas, whether at the local, state, or federal levels. Amicus briefs 
then can be part of the process of deepening civic engagement. 
D. Education 
At the end of the day, change that is durable comes from education. 
The team that came together on this amicus brief launched a public 
education campaign entitled “Stop Repeating History! Reject the 
Shameful Legacy of Japanese American Incarceration.”58 The campaign 
has involved persistent engagement with the press, holding public 
events, and distributing information and educational materials through 
various social media. 
The Akin Gump team has participated in this effort to galvanize 
the community as well, through education activities such as panel dis-
cussions in connection with film screenings59 and at the Collaborative 
Bar Leadership Academy,60 and at the annual conferences of the Nation-
al Asian Pacific American Bar Association and South Asian Bar 
Association of North America; testimony in support of a New York City 
resolution creating an annual Fred T. Korematsu Day of Civil Liberties 
and the Constitution; and the ceremony observing the inaugural of that 
day in New York City in 2018. The Akin Gump team found that these 
activities have been tremendously helpful in intergenerational learning 
and teaching, and have allowed older and younger lawyers to learn from 
each other. We also found that many of the people who attended these 
events, or whom Minami and Tamaki contacted for the Stop Repeating 
History campaign, would tell us how Minami and Tamaki were inspi-
rational role models for their trailblazing work on the coram nobis cases 
and for their balance of private practice and public interest.61 
The amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court has one specific 
educational mission with regard to its intended audience of the Court: 
 
58. Stop Repeating History!: Reject the Shameful Legacy of 
Japanese American Incarceration, https://stoprepeatinghistory.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z2AB-3XV4] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
59. And Then They Came for Us, www.thentheycamedoc.com [https:// 
perma.cc/K2FL-69LQ] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
60. The Collaborative Bar Leadership Academy is a joint initiative of the 
American Bar Association, Hispanic National Bar Association, National 
Asian Pacific American Bar Association, National Bar Association, National 
LGBT Bar Association, and the National Native American Bar Association. 
See 2018 Collaborative Bar Leadership Academy, ABA, https://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/diversity/DiversityCommission/barleadershipacad
emy.html [https://perma.cc/3WBR-73D9] (last visited Apr. 30, 2018). 
61. See also Minami Tamaki Yamauchi Kwok & Lee Foundation, https: 
//mtykl.org [https://perma.cc/7P4D-88ZJ]. The Minami Tamaki Yamuchi 
Kwok & Lee Foundation provided funding for the Stop Repeating History! 
campaign. 
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it is intended to remind the Court to fulfill its “essential role in our de-
mocracy by checking unfounded exercises of power.”62 It is intended to 
remind the Court of the disaster that occurred when the Court, in 1943 
and 1944, failed to fulfill its essential role.63 It is intended to remind the 
Court to not repeat the mistakes made by earlier courts. 
Readers of the amicus brief can decide for themselves if the lessons 
contained in it are worth learning and then decide what it is that they 
might do to stop our various institutions from repeating past mistakes. 
 
62. Infra at 1238.  
63. Cf. Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases: A Disaster, 54 Yale 
L.J. 489, 515 (1945). 
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Brief of Karen Korematsu, Jay 
Hirabayashi, Holly Yasui, the 
Fred T. Korematsu Center for 
Law and Equality, Civil Rights 
Organizations, and National Bar 
Associations of Color as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents 
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1  
 Karen Korematsu, Jay Hirabayashi, and Holly Yasui—the children 
of Fred Korematsu, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Minoru Yasui—come 
forward as amici curiae because they see the disturbing relevance of 
this Court’s decisions in their fathers’ infamous cases challenging the 
mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans during World 
War II to the serious questions raised by Presidential Proclamation No. 
9645. 
Minoru Yasui was a 25-year-old attorney in Portland, Oregon, 
when, on March 28, 1942, he intentionally defied the government’s first 
actionable order imposing a curfew on persons of Japanese ancestry in 
order to challenge the order’s constitutionality. Gordon Hirabayashi 
was a 24-year-old college senior in Seattle, Washington, when, on May 
16, 1942, he similarly chose to defy the government’s curfew and 
removal orders. Fred Korematsu was a 22-year-old welder in Oakland, 
California, when, on May 30, 1942, he was arrested for refusing to report 
for removal.   
All three men brought their constitutional challenges to this Court. 
Deferring to the government’s claim that the orders were justified by 
military necessity, the Court affirmed their convictions. Our Nation has 
since recognized that the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese 
Americans was wrong; the three cases have been widely condemned; 
 
1. This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties. No counsel for any 
party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person or entity other 
than amici curiae made a monetary contribution intended to fund the brief’s 
preparation or submission.  
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and all three men have been recognized with the Presidential Medal of 
Freedom for their wartime courage and lifetime work advancing civil 
and human rights. 
Their children have sought to carry forward their fathers’ legacy by 
educating the public and, as appropriate, reminding the courts of the 
human toll and constitutional harms wrought by governmental actions, 
carried out in the name of national security, that impact men, women, 
and children belonging to disfavored minority groups. Guilt, loyalty, 
and threat are individual attributes. Courts must be vigilant when these 
attributes are imputed to entire racial, religious, and/or ethnic groups. 
The Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu cases stand as important 
reminders of the need for courts—and especially this Court—to fulfill 
their essential role in our democracy by checking unfounded exercises 
of executive power. 
The Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui families are proud to stand 
with the following public interest organizations: 
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality (“Korematsu 
Center”) is based at the Seattle University School of Law. Inspired by 
the legacy of Fred Korematsu, the Korematsu Center works to advance 
justice for all through research, advocacy, and education. The 
Korematsu Center has a special interest in addressing government 
action targeting classes of persons based on race, nationality, or religion 
and in seeking to ensure that courts understand the historical—and, at 
times, unjust—underpinnings of arguments asserted to support the 
exercise of such executive power. The Korematsu Center does not, here 
or otherwise, represent the official views of Seattle University. 
Asian Americans Advancing Justice (“Advancing Justice”) is the 
national affiliation of five nonpartisan civil rights organizations whose 
offices are located in Washington D.C. (AAJC), San Francisco (Asian 
Law Caucus), Atlanta, Chicago and Los Angeles. Through direct 
services, impact litigation, amicus briefs, policy advocacy, leadership 
development, and capacity building, the Advancing Justice affiliates 
advocate for marginalized members of the Asian American, Native 
Hawaiian, Pacific Islander, and other underserved communities, 
including immigrant members of those communities. 
The Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
(“AALDEF”), founded in 1974, is a national organization that protects 
and promotes the civil rights of Asian Americans. By combining 
litigation, advocacy, education, and organizing, AALDEF works with 
Asian American communities nationwide to secure human rights for all. 
In 1982, AALDEF supported reparations for Japanese Americans 
forcibly relocated and imprisoned during World War II. After 9/11, 
AALDEF represented more than 800 individuals from Muslim-majority 
countries who were called in to report to immigration authorities under 
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the Special Registration program. AALDEF is currently providing 
community education and legal counseling to Asian Americans affected 
by the challenged Presidential Proclamation. 
The Hispanic National Bar Association (“HNBA”) comprises 
thousands of Latino lawyers, law professors, law students, legal 
professionals, state and federal judges, legislators, and bar affiliates 
across the country. The HNBA is committed to advocacy on issues of 
importance, including immigration and protection of refugees, to the 53 
million people of Hispanic heritage living in the United States.   
The Japanese American Citizens League of Hawaii, Honolulu 
Chapter (“JACL Honolulu”) draws upon Hawaii’s rich, multiethnic 
society and strong cultural values, but broadly focuses on addressing 
discrimination and intolerance towards all people victimized by 
injustice and prejudice. JACL Honolulu supported redress for Japanese 
Americans incarcerated during World War II and sponsors annual 
events to educate the public regarding that unjust incarceration, one of 
the core reasons for the founding of the JACL Honolulu chapter. 
LatinoJustice PRLDEF, Inc. (“LatinoJustice”) is a national civil 
rights legal defense fund that has defended the constitutional rights and 
equal protection of all Latinos under the law. LatinoJustice’s continuing 
mission is to promote the civic participation of the greater pan-Latino 
community in the United States, to cultivate Latino community 
leaders, and to engage in and support law reform litigation across the 
country addressing criminal justice, education, employment, fair 
housing, immigrants’ rights, language rights, redistricting, and voting 
rights. During its 45-year history, LatinoJustice has litigated numerous 
cases in both state and federal courts challenging governmental racial 
discrimination.  
The National Bar Association (“NBA”) is the largest and oldest 
association of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges in 
the United States. Founded in 1925 when there were only 1,000 African-
American attorneys nationwide and when other national bar 
associations, such as the ABA, did not admit African-American 
attorneys, the NBA today has a membership of approximately 66,000 
lawyers, judges, law professors and law students, and has over 75 
affiliate chapters. Throughout its history, the NBA consistently has 
advocated on behalf of African Americans and other minority 
populations regarding issues affecting the legal profession. 
The South Asian Bar Association of North America (“SABA”) is 
the umbrella organization for 26 regional bar associations in North 
America representing the interests of over 6,000 attorneys of South 
Asian descent. Providing a vital link for the South Asian community to 
the law and legal system, SABA takes an active interest in the legal 
rights of South Asian and other minority communities. Members of 
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SABA include immigration lawyers and others who represent persons 
that have been and will be affected by the Presidential Proclamation. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
“Often the question has been raised whether this country could wage 
a new war without the loss of its fundamental liberties at home. Here is 
one occasion for this Court to give an unequivocal answer to that 
question and show the world that we can fight for democracy and 
preserve it too.” 
 
Gordon Hirabayashi made that plea to the Court in 1943, as he 
appealed his conviction for violating military orders issued three months 
after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Authorized by Executive 
Order No. 9066, those orders led to the forced removal and incarceration 
of over 120,000 men, women, and children of Japanese descent living 
on the West Coast. 
Mr. Hirabayashi did not stand alone before this Court. Minoru 
Yasui likewise invoked our Nation’s ideals in casting his separate but 
related appeal as “the case of all whose parents came to our shores for 
a haven of refuge” and insisting that the country should respond to war 
and strife “in the American way and not by *** acts of injustice.” 
Appellant Br. 55-56, Yasui v. United States, No. 871 (U.S. Apr. 30, 
1943). The Court denied the appeals of both men. See Hirabayashi v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 
(1943).   
The following year, this Court revisited the mass removal and 
incarceration of Japanese Americans in Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214 (1944). In Korematsu, the Court again failed to stand as 
a bulwark against governmental action that undermines core 
constitutional principles. By refusing to scrutinize the government’s 
claim that its abhorrent treatment of Japanese Americans was justified 
by military necessity, the Court enabled the government to cover its 
racially discriminatory policies in the cloak of national security.  
In this case, the Court is once again asked to abdicate its critical 
role in safeguarding fundamental freedoms. Invoking national security, 
the government seeks near complete deference to the President’s 
decision to deny indefinitely all immigrant and most non-immigrant 
visas to nationals of six Muslim-majority countries. See Proclamation 
9645, “Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting 
Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-
Safety Threats,” 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 27, 2017) (“Presidential 
Proclamation”).  
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The government claims it is merely asking for the application of 
established legal principles, but the extreme deference it seeks is not 
rooted in sound constitutional tradition. Rather, it rests on doctrinal 
tenets infected with long-repudiated racial and nativist precepts. In 
support of the sweeping proposition that the President’s authority to 
exclude aliens is unbounded, the government previously invoked the so-
called “plenary power” doctrine—that doctrine derives from decisions 
such as Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), which 
relied on pejorative racial stereotypes to eschew judicial scrutiny in 
upholding a law that prohibited Chinese laborers from returning to the 
United States after travel abroad. Id. at 595. 
Although no longer using the term “plenary power,” the 
government continues to assert that “any policy toward aliens”—
including a decision to exclude an entire class of individuals based on 
religion and national origin—is “so exclusively entrusted to the political 
branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry 
or interference.” Gov’t Br. 23 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 
U.S. 580, 588-589 (1952)). As the Ninth Circuit observed, the numbing 
judicial passivity the government demands “runs contrary to the 
fundamental structure of our constitutional democracy” in which “it is 
the role of the judiciary to interpret the law, a duty that will sometimes 
require the ‘[r]esolution of litigation challenging the constitutional 
authority of one of the three branches.’” Washington v. Trump, 847 
F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)). 
Even more than the early “plenary power” decisions, the shades of 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui lurking in the government’s 
argument should give this Court pause. In those cases, the government’s 
policies were ostensibly backed by the controversial “Final Report” 
issued by Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, the military commander 
who ordered the mass removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans 
on the West Coast. By the time it was finally presented to this Court, 
the Final Report—which history revealed to be riddled with falsehoods 
about the national security threat posed by Japanese Americans—had 
been materially altered to hide the racist motivations of its author.  
Here, another report, this time from the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, purports to justify the President’s decision to exclude classes 
of individuals based on nationality and religion—only this time, the 
government has resisted allowing even the courts to review the report. 
See Letter to Patricia S. Connor, Clerk of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, from Sharon Swingle, Counsel for 
Defendants-Appellants, re: IRAP v. Trump, No. 17-2231 (Nov. 24, 
2017) (“Fourth Circuit Letter”). That fact alone should raise alarms. 
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Regrettably, however, hidden and suspect government reports are 
far from the only similarity between this case and Korematsu, 
Hirabayashi, and Yasui. As here, in those cases, the government denied 
that its policies were grounded in “invidious *** discrimination” and 
asked the Court to take it at its word that “the security of the nation” 
justified blanket action against an “entire group *** at once.” Gov’t 
Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, No. 870 (U.S. May 8, 1943). In its 
now infamous decisions, this Court agreed. 
In Hirabayashi, the Court concluded that even though racial 
distinctions are “odious to a free people,” it could not “reject as 
unfounded the [government’s] judgment” that the measures taken 
against Japanese Americans were necessary. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 
99-100. Going further in Korematsu, the Court denied that race played 
any role in the government’s decisions: “Cast[ing] this case into outlines 
of racial prejudice,” the Court opined, “without reference to the real 
military dangers which were presented, merely confuses the issue.” 323 
U.S. at 223. Accepting the government’s assurance, the Court went on 
to find that “Korematsu was not excluded from the [West Coast] 
because of hostility to him or his race[,] [h]e was excluded because *** 
the properly constituted military authorities *** decided that the 
military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese 
ancestry be segregated *** temporarily.” Id.  
Not all members of the Court were convinced, however. Three 
Justices dissented, including Justice Murphy, who declared that the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans “falls into the ugly abyss of racism,” 
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233, and Justice Jackson, who pointed out that 
the Court “had no real evidence” to support the government’s 
assertions of military necessity. Moreover, Justice Jackson warned, the 
Court had created “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any 
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.” 
Id. at 246. 
As history has made us acutely aware, the dissenters’ doubts as to 
the veracity of the government’s assertion of military necessity were 
well-founded, and their recognition of the gravity of the Court’s decision 
was prophetic. Four decades after the Court upheld their convictions, 
Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred Korematsu successfully 
sought to have them vacated in unprecedented coram nobis 
proceedings. Evidence presented in those cases showed that the 
“military urgency” on which this Court predicated its decision (and the 
purported justification asserted in General DeWitt’s Final Report) was 
nothing more than a smokescreen: The real reason for the government’s 
deplorable treatment of Japanese Americans was not acts of espionage, 
but rather a baseless perception of disloyalty grounded in racial 
stereotypes.   
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With the benefit of hindsight, Korematsu (and by inference 
Hirabayashi and Yasui) “stands as a constant caution that in times of 
war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in 
protecting constitutional guarantees” and “national security must not 
be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and 
accountability.” Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 
(N.D. Cal. 1984). Put simply, those cases “illustrate[] that it can be 
highly destructive of civil liberties to understand the Constitution as 
giving the President a blank check.” Stephen Breyer, The Court 
and the World: American Law and the New Global 
Realities 84 (2015). 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are as wrong today as they 
were on the day they were decided. If it were to accept the government’s 
invitation here to abdicate its judicial responsibility, the Court would 
repeat its failures in those widely condemned cases. The Court should 
instead take this opportunity to acknowledge the historic wrong in 
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, and to repudiate its refusal to 
scrutinize the government’s claim of necessity and its consequent failure 
to recognize the military orders’ racist underpinnings. Heeding the 
lessons of history, the Court should subject the President’s decision to 
meaningful judicial scrutiny and affirm the Founders’ visionary 
principle that an independent and vigilant judiciary is a foundational 
element of a healthy democracy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Government’s Conception of Plenary Power Derives from Cases 
Infected with Racist and Xenophobic Prejudices. 
In defending the first Executive Order that sought to exclude aliens 
from Muslim-majority countries, the government argued that “political 
branches[] [have] plenary constitutional authority over foreign affairs, 
national security, and immigration.” Gov’t Emergency Mot. 15-16, 
Washington v. Trump, No. 17-35105 (9th Cir. Feb. 4, 2017). In light of 
that “plenary authority,” the government asserted, “[j]udicial second-
guessing of the President’s determination that a temporary suspension 
of entry of certain classes of aliens was necessary *** to protect national 
security *** constitute[s] an impermissible intrusion.” Id. at 15.   
Despite shedding the “plenary power” label, the government’s 
central argument remains unchanged: The political branches’ “power 
to *** exclude aliens” is “largely immune from judicial control.” Gov’t 
Br. 18 (ellipsis in original) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 
(1977)). This Court, however, has never recognized an unbridled 
“plenary” power in the immigration realm that would preclude judicial 
review. And to the extent that it has shown excessive deference to the 
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political branches in some cases, those precedents are linked to racist 
attitudes from a past era that have long since fallen out of favor.  
1. In Chae Chan Ping v. United States, known as The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, the Court upheld a statute barring the return of 
Chinese laborers who had departed the United States prior to its 
passage. 130 U.S. at 581-582. Describing the reasons underlying the 
law’s enactment, the Court characterized Chinese laborers as “content 
with the simplest fare, such as would not suffice for our laborers and 
artisans,” and observed that they remained “strangers in the land, 
residing apart by themselves, *** adhering to the customs and usages 
of their own country,” and unable “to assimilate with our people.” Id. 
at 595. “The differences of race added greatly to the difficulties of the 
situation.” Id. Residents of the West Coast, the Court explained, 
warned of an “Oriental invasion” and “saw or believed they saw *** 
great danger that at no distant day *** [the West] would be overrun 
by them, unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.” 
Id.   
Far from applying a skeptical eye to the law in light of the clear 
animus motivating its passage, the Court found that “[i]f *** the 
government of the United States, through its legislative department, 
considers the presence of foreigners of a different race in this country, 
who will not assimilate with us, to be dangerous to its peace and 
security *** its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary.” The 
Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606; see also Natsu Taylor Saito, 
The Enduring Effect of the Chinese Exclusion Cases:  The “Plenary 
Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of Human Rights, 10 Asian 
L.J. 13, 15 (2003). In reality, the “right of self-preservation” that the 
Court validated as justification for the government’s unbounded power 
to exclude immigrants was ethnic and racial self-preservation, not the 
preservation of borders or national security. 130 U.S. at 608; see id. at 
606 (“It matters not in what form *** aggression and encroachment 
come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character, 
or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us.”). 
Similar racist and xenophobic attitudes are evident in decisions 
following The Chinese Exclusion Case. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. 
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 729-730 (1893) (upholding requirement 
that Chinese resident aliens offer “at least one credible white witness” 
in order to remain in the country); id. at 730 (noting Congress’s belief 
that testimony from Chinese witnesses could not be credited because of 
“the loose notions entertained by the witnesses of the obligation of an 
oath” (quoting The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 598)).  
2. Even in its early plenary power decisions, however, the Court 
recognized that the government’s sovereign authority is subject to 
constitutional limitations. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al. in Support of Respondents 
 
1245 
 
604 (“[S]overeign powers *** [are] restricted in their exercise only by 
the constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice 
which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations.”). 
Indeed, from the doctrine’s inception, the Court divided over the reach 
of the government’s power in light of those limitations.   
Fong Yue Ting, which upheld a law requiring Chinese laborers 
residing in the United States to obtain a special certificate of residence 
to avoid deportation, generated three dissenting opinions. See 149 U.S. 
at 738 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“I deny that there is any arbitrary and 
unrestrained power to banish residents, even resident aliens.”); id. at 
744 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 761 (Fuller, J., dissenting). Even 
Justice Field, who authored the Court’s opinion in The Chinese 
Exclusion Case, sought to limit the plenary power doctrine’s application 
with regard to alien residents:  
As men having our common humanity, they are protected by all 
the guaranties of the constitution. To hold that they are subject 
to any different law, or are less protected in any particular, than 
other persons, is *** to ignore the teachings of our history *** 
and the language of our constitution. 
Id. at 754. 
Nearly 60 years later, judicial skepticism regarding an unrestrained 
plenary power persisted—and proliferated. In Harisiades v. 
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), the Court, relying on Korematsu (see 
note 2, infra), upheld a provision permitting the deportation of resident 
aliens who were members of the Communist Party. In dissent, Justice 
Douglas quoted Justice Brewer’s words in Fong Yue Ting, observing 
that they “grow[] in power with the passing years”: 
This doctrine of powers inherent in sovereignty is one both 
indefinite and dangerous. *** The governments of other nations 
have elastic powers. Ours are fixed and bounded by a written 
constitution. The expulsion of a race may be within the inherent 
powers of a despotism. History, before the adoption of this 
constitution, was not destitute of examples of the exercise of such 
a power; and its framers were familiar with history, and wisely, 
as it seems to me, they gave to this government no general power 
to banish. 
Id. at 599-600.   
In another McCarthy-era precedent, four Justices advocated for 
limitations on the plenary power doctrine. In Shaughnessy v. United 
States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953), the Court rejected any 
constitutional challenge to the exclusion of an alien who had previously 
resided in the United States, despite his resulting indefinite detention 
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at Ellis Island. In dissent, Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, 
reasoned that “[n]o society is free where government makes one person’s 
liberty depend upon the arbitrary will of another.” Id. at 217. 
“Dictatorships,” he observed, “have done this since time immemorial. 
They do now.” Id. Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Frankfurter, added 
that such aliens must be “accorded procedural due process of law.” Id. 
at 224. 
3. Perhaps reflecting the shift away from the xenophobic and race-
based characterizations prevalent in its early plenary power precedents, 
the Court in recent years has been more willing to enforce constitutional 
limitations on the government’s authority over immigration matters.   
In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993), for example, the Court held 
that INS regulations must at least “rationally advanc[e] some legitimate 
governmental purpose.” Id. at 306. In Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21 
(1982), the Court affirmed that a resident alien returning from a brief 
trip abroad must be afforded due process in an exclusion proceeding. 
Id. at 33. And in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in response 
to the government’s contention that “Congress has ‘plenary power’ to 
create immigration law, and *** the Judicial Branch must defer to 
Executive and Legislative Branch decisionmaking in that area,” the 
Court observed that such “power is subject to important constitutional 
limitations.” Id. at 695 (citations omitted). “[F]ocus[ing] upon those 
limitations,” id., the Court determined that the indefinite detention of 
aliens deemed removable would raise “serious constitutional concerns” 
and accordingly construed the statute at issue to avoid those problems, 
id. at 682. See generally Washington, 847 F.3d at 1162-1163 (collecting 
cases demonstrating reviewability of federal government action in 
immigration and national security matters).  
The Court’s most recent decision in this area provides further 
support for the conclusion that, after more than a century of erosion, 
the notion of plenary power over immigration is little more than a relic.   
In Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015), this Court considered a 
due process claim arising from the denial without adequate explanation 
of a spouse’s visa application. Although it described the power of the 
political branches over immigration as “plenary,” Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion in Din made clear that courts may review an exercise 
of that power. Id. at 2139-2140. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that 
the Court in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), had declined 
to balance the constitutional rights of American citizens injured by a 
visa denial against “Congress’ ‘plenary power to make rules for the 
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess those 
characteristics which Congress has forbidden.’” Din, 135 S. Ct. at 2139 
(quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 766). But he explained that the Court did 
inquire “whether the Government had provided a ‘facially legitimate 
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and bona fide’ reason for its action.” Id. at 2140 (quoting Mandel, 408 
U.S. at 770). And while as a general matter courts are not to “look 
behind” the government’s asserted reason, courts should do so if the 
challenger has made “an affirmative showing of bad faith.” Id. at 2141.   
To be sure, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Din acknowledged that 
the political branches are entitled to wide latitude and deference in 
immigration matters. For that reason, the government relies heavily on 
Din and Mandel to argue that its assertion of a national security 
rationale is sufficient to justify the Presidential Proclamation and to 
preclude further judicial scrutiny. See Gov’t Br. at 58-64. But, as the 
Ninth Circuit has recognized, Din (and Mandel before it) concerned an 
individual visa denial on the facts of that case. Washington, 847 F.3d 
at 1163-1164. By contrast, the Proclamation sets a nationwide 
immigration policy of denying all immigrant and most non-immigrant 
visas to aliens of certain nationalities. While it may be sensible for 
courts ordinarily to defer to the judgment of the political branches when 
considering the application of immigration law to a particular alien, the 
President’s decision to issue a broadly applicable immigration policy—
especially one aimed at nationals of particular countries likely to share 
a common religion—is properly the subject of more searching judicial 
review. See id.  
All told, modern judicial precedent supports the notion that courts 
have both the power and the responsibility to review Presidential 
Proclamation 9645. Where, as here, the Court is asked to review a far-
reaching program—promulgated at the highest level of the Executive 
Branch and targeting aliens based on nationality and religion—
precedent and common sense demand more than an assessment of 
whether the government has offered a “facially legitimate and bona 
fide” rationale for its policy. Rather, this policy, both on its face and in 
light of the glaring clues as to its motivations, cries out for careful 
judicial scrutiny.  
II. Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui Stand as Stark Reminders of the 
Need for Searching Judicial Review when the Government Targets 
Disfavored Minorities in the Name of National Security.  
This Court need not look far for a reminder of the constitutional 
costs and human suffering that flow from the Judiciary’s failure to rein 
in sweeping governmental action against disfavored minorities. And it 
need not look far for a reminder of the Executive Branch’s use of 
national security as a pretext to discriminate against such groups. The 
Court need look only to its own precedents—its all but universally 
condemned wartime decisions in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui.   
1. On February 19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order No. 9066, authorizing the Secretary of War to designate “military 
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areas” from which “any or all persons” could be excluded and “with 
respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave” 
would be subject to “whatever restrictions the Secretary of War or the 
appropriate Military Commander may impose.” Exec. Order No. 9066, 
“Authorizing the Secretary of War to Prescribe Military Areas,” 7 Fed. 
Reg. 1407, 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). Adding its imprimatur to the 
Executive Order, Congress made violation of any restrictions issued 
thereunder a federal offense. An Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-
503, 56 Stat. 173. 
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, head of the Western Defense 
Command, used that authority to issue a series of proclamations that 
led to the removal and incarceration of all individuals of Japanese 
ancestry living in “Military Area No. 1”—an exclusion area covering 
the entire Pacific Coast. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 89. A curfew order 
came first. Soon after, Japanese Americans were ordered to abandon 
their homes and communities on the West Coast for tarpaper barracks 
(euphemistically called “relocation centers”) surrounded by barbed wire 
and machine gun towers in desolate areas inland. Id. at 90. 
For different individual reasons, but sharing a deep sense of justice, 
Minoru Yasui, Gordon Hirabayashi, and Fred Korematsu refused to 
comply with General DeWitt’s orders. Yasui, a young lawyer, regarded 
the curfew as an affront to American constitutional values. “To make 
it a crime for me to do the same thing as any non-Japanese person *** 
solely on the basis of ancestry,” he explained, “was, in my opinion, an 
absolutely abominable concept and wholly unacceptable.” Testimony of 
Minoru Yasui, Nat’l Comm. for Redress, Japanese Am. Citizens League 
9, Comm’n on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (1981). 
“Our law and our basic concept of justice had always been founded 
upon the fundamental principle that no person should be punished but 
for that individual’s act, and not because of one’s ancestry.” Id. at 10. 
Convinced of the curfew’s illegality, Yasui immediately defied it in 
order to initiate a constitutional challenge. 
 Hirabayashi, a student at the University of Washington, also 
defied the orders so that he could challenge their constitutionality, 
saying that he “considered it [his] duty to maintain the democratic 
standards for which this nation lives.” Peter Irons, Justice at 
War: The Story of the Japanese American Internment 
Cases 88 (1984).   
Korematsu, a welder living in Oakland, CA, refused to obey the 
removal orders so that he could remain with his fiancée who was not 
subject to removal because she was not Japanese American. The last of 
the three to face arrest and prosecution, Korematsu “shared with Yasui 
and Hirabayashi an equal devotion to constitutional principle” and 
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believed that the statute under which he was convicted was wrong. Id. 
at 98. 
2. The constitutional challenges Yasui, Hirabayashi, and 
Korematsu made to the military orders soon made their way to this 
Court. But far from fulfilling its essential role in the constitutional 
structure that entrusts the Judiciary with the protection of 
fundamental rights, the Court set upon a path of judicial abdication 
that today serves as a cautionary tale.   
In Hirabayashi’s case, the Court elected to consider only his 
conviction for violating the curfew order, leaving unanswered his 
challenge to his conviction for failing to report to a Civil Control 
Station—a precursor to removal from his home in Seattle. Hirabayashi, 
320 U.S. at 85. Harkening back to The Chinese Exclusion Case, the 
Court repeated the government’s claim that “social, economic and 
political conditions” “intensified the[] solidarity” of Japanese Americans 
and “prevented their assimilation as an integral part of the white 
population.” Id. at 96. Betraying no skepticism of these premises, the 
Court found that, in view of these and other attributes of the “isolation” 
of Japanese Americans and their “relatively little social intercourse *** 
[with] the white population,” “Congress and the Executive could 
reasonably have concluded that these conditions *** encouraged the 
continued attachment of members of this group to Japan and Japanese 
institutions.” Id. at 98. “Whatever views we may entertain regarding 
the loyalty to this country of the citizens of Japanese ancestry,” the 
Court continued, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the 
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members 
of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely 
and quickly ascertained.” Id. at 99.   
Having upheld the curfew in Hirabayashi, the Court issued only a 
short opinion remanding Yasui’s case to the Ninth Circuit. Yasui, 320 
U.S. at 115. Because the district court had imposed a sentence based 
on its determination that Yasui had renounced his American 
citizenship, and the government did not defend that finding, the Court 
remanded the matter for resentencing. Id. at 117. The Court thereby 
avoided addressing the district court’s conclusion, supported by 
extensive analysis, that the military orders were unconstitutional as 
applied to citizens. See United States v. Yasui, 48 F. Supp. 40, 44-54 
(D. Or. 1942). 
The Court’s third opportunity to confront the mass removal and 
incarceration program came a year-and-a-half later, in Korematsu’s 
case. The Court again narrowed the issues before it, rejecting 
Korematsu’s argument that the removal order could not be extricated 
from the incarceration he would inevitably face if he complied with that 
order. 323 U.S. at 216. Then, despite affirming that racial distinctions 
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are “immediately suspect” and “must [be] subject *** to the most rigid 
scrutiny,” id., the Court denied, without probing examination, that the 
military orders were driven by racial hostility. The Court reiterated its 
conclusion from Hirabayashi that it would not substitute its judgment 
for that of the military authorities. “There was evidence of disloyalty 
on the part of some,” the Court reasoned, and “the military authorities 
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We 
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—
now say that at that time these actions were unjustified.” Id. at 223-
224. 
When the Court decided Korematsu, however, three members 
rejected the government’s arguments. In vigorous dissents, Justices 
Murphy and Jackson sharply questioned the validity of the military 
justification the government advanced. Although acknowledging that 
the discretion of those entrusted with national security matters “must, 
as a matter of *** common sense, be wide,” Justice Murphy declared 
that “it is essential that there be definite limits to military discretion” 
and that individuals not be “left impoverished of their constitutional 
rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor 
support.” 323 U.S. at 234. In his view, the exclusion order “clearly d[id] 
not meet th[is] test” as it relied “for its reasonableness upon the 
assumption that all persons of Japanese ancestry may have a dangerous 
tendency to commit sabotage and espionage.” Id. at 234-235 (emphasis 
added). In fact, as Justice Murphy noted, intelligence investigations 
found no evidence of Japanese American sabotage or espionage. Id. at 
241. And even if “there were some disloyal persons of Japanese descent 
on the Pacific Coast,” Justice Murphy reasoned, “to infer that examples 
of individual disloyalty prove group disloyalty and justify 
discriminatory action against the entire group” is nothing more than 
“th[e] legalization of racism.” Id. at 240-241, 242.   
Justice Jackson was equally dubious of the factual basis for the 
government’s claim that the military orders were justified. The 
government never submitted General DeWitt’s Final Report to the 
lower courts. Although the report was eventually presented to this 
Court, by then it was too late for development of record evidence to 
challenge the report or counter its assertions. Those facts were not lost 
on Justice Jackson, who viewed the report with skepticism. “How does 
the Court know,” he asked, “that these orders have a reasonable basis 
in necessity?” 323 U.S. at 245. Pointing out that “[n]o evidence 
whatever on that subject ha[d] been taken by this or any other court” 
and that the Final Report was the subject of “sharp controversy as to 
[its] credibility,” Justice Jackson observed that the Court had “no real 
evidence before it” and thus “ha[d] no choice but to accept General 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 4·2018 
Brief of Karen Korematsu, et al. in Support of Respondents 
 
1251 
 
DeWitt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination, that what he did was reasonable.” Id.   
Justice Jackson saw grave dangers in the Court’s opinion. While an 
unconstitutional military order is short-lived, he observed, “once a 
judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to 
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that 
the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has 
validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure 
and of transplanting American citizens.” 323 U.S. at 246. With that, 
Justice Jackson issued a prophetic warning: By “validat[ing] the 
principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of 
transplanting American citizens,” the Court had created “a loaded 
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a 
plausible claim of an urgent need.” Id.2 
3. The dissenters’ fears proved to be well-founded. Decades after 
this Court’s decisions in Hirabayashi, Yasui, and Korematsu, newly 
discovered government records revealed not only that intelligence 
reports and data contradicted the claim that the mass removal and 
incarceration program was justified by military necessity, but also that 
the government knew as much when it convinced the Court to affirm 
the defendants’ convictions.3 
In 1983, armed with those newly discovered records, Yasui, 
Hirabayashi, and Korematsu filed coram nobis petitions seeking to 
vacate their convictions. As the court found in the Hirabayashi case, 
government records showed that General DeWitt’s Final Report had 
been materially altered in order to fabricate an acceptable factual 
justification for the mass removal and incarceration program. 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 1445, 1456-1457 (W.D. 
 
2. Justice Jackson’s usage of Korematsu and Hirabayashi as precedent in 
Harisiades (see p. 16, supra), on which the government relies (Gov’t Br. 18), 
brought this warning to life. In Harisiades, a noncitizen claimed that due 
process protected his liberties in the same way it does the rights of citizens.  
But Korematsu and Hirabayashi, Justice Jackson wrote, show that even 
citizens are unprotected from far-reaching government claims of national 
security. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591 & n.17 (“When citizens raised the 
Constitution as a shield against expulsion from their homes and places of 
business, the Court refused to find hardship a cause for judicial 
intervention.”). Constrained by stare decisis, Justice Jackson applied 
Korematsu as standing precedent to reject Harisiades’ constitutional claim. 
That application to the specific facts in Harisiades extended Korematsu’s 
principle of extreme deference to “new purposes”—precisely the danger 
Justice Jackson predicted in his “loaded weapon” warning. 323 U.S. at 246. 
3. Those records are discussed at length in Justice at War: The Story of the 
Japanese American Internment Cases by Peter Irons, supra, who, along with 
Aiko Herzig-Yoshinaga, unearthed them. 
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Wash. 1986). Although the version of the report presented to this Court 
stated that it was impossible to identify potentially disloyal Japanese 
Americans in the time available, a prior printed version—submitted to 
the War Department while the government’s briefs in Hirabayashi and 
Yasui were being finalized—made clear that the decision to issue the 
challenged orders had nothing to do with urgency. Rather, General 
Dewitt’s decision turned on his view that Japanese Americans were 
inherently disloyal on account of their “ties of race, intense feeling of 
filial piety and *** strong bonds of common tradition, culture and 
customs.” Id. at 1449. “It was not that there was insufficient time in 
which to make such a determination” the original report stated; “a 
positive determination could not be made [because] an exact separation 
of the ‘sheep and the goats’ was unfeasible.” Id. (quoting Lieutenant 
General John L. DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the 
West Coast ch. 2 (1942)). 
Beyond exposing the racist underpinnings of General DeWitt’s 
orders (as well as the pretextual nature of the claim of urgency), the 
coram nobis cases revealed that the government possessed information 
rebutting the assertion in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans 
were involved in sabotage and espionage. Hirabayashi v. United States, 
828 F.2d 591, 601 (9th Cir. 1987). The Office of Naval Intelligence 
(“ONI”), which the President charged with monitoring West Coast 
Japanese American communities, had determined in its official report 
that Japanese Americans were overwhelmingly loyal and posed no 
security risk. ONI thus recommended handling any potential disloyalty 
on an individual, not group, basis. ONI found, contrary to the 
government’s representation to this Court, that mass incarceration was 
unnecessary, as “individual determinations could be made 
expeditiously.” Id. at 602 n.11 (emphasis added); see also Irons, supra, 
at 203. In addition, reports from the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) and Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) directly 
refuted claims in the DeWitt Report that Japanese Americans were 
engaged in shore-to-ship signaling, intimating Japanese American 
espionage. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417. Indeed, FBI Director 
Hoover wrote to Attorney General Biddle shortly before President 
Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 that the push for mass racial 
handling was based on politics rather than facts. Memorandum from J. 
Edgar Hoover, Dir. FBI to Francis Biddle, Att’y Gen. (Feb. 2, 1942). 
Department of Justice attorney John Burling, co-author of the 
government’s brief, sought to alert the Court of the FBI and FCC 
intelligence that directly refuted the DeWitt Report. Burling included 
in his brief a crucial footnote that read: “The recital [in General 
DeWitt’s report] of the circumstances justifying the evacuation as a 
matter of military necessity *** is in several respects, particularly with 
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reference to the use of illegal radio transmitters and to shore-to-ship 
signaling by persons of Japanese ancestry, in conflict with information 
in the possession of the Department of Justice.” Korematsu, 584 F. 
Supp. at 1417 (emphasis and citation omitted). But high-level Justice 
Department lawyers stopped the brief’s printing. Despite Burling’s 
vociferous protest about the DeWitt Report’s “intentional falsehoods,” 
id. at 1418, the footnote was diluted to near incoherence, even implying 
the opposite of Burling’s intended message. As revised, the footnote 
stated: 
[The DeWitt Report] is relied on in this brief for statistics and 
other details concerning the actual evacuation and the events that 
took place subsequent thereto. We have specifically recited in this 
brief the facts relating to the justification for the evacuation, of 
which we ask the Court to take judicial notice, and we rely upon 
the Final Report only to the extent that it relates to such facts. 
Gov’t Br. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22 (U.S. Oct. 5, 
1944). Notwithstanding an earlier warning from Justice Department 
lawyer Edward Ennis that failing to alert the Court to the contrary 
intelligence in DOJ’s possession “might approximate the suppression of 
evidence,” Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602 n.11 (citation omitted), the 
Justice Department concealed from the Court this material evidence on 
military necessity.  
In light of the evidence presented, the courts hearing Fred 
Korematsu and Gordon Hirabayashi’s coram nobis cases concluded that 
the government’s misconduct had effected “a manifest injustice” and 
that the mass removal and incarceration program had been validated 
based on unfounded charges of treason. Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 
1417; Hirabayashi, 627 F. Supp. at 1447.4 In granting Korematsu’s 
coram nobis petition, Judge Patel articulated the modern significance 
of the wartime cases:  
Korematsu *** stands as a constant caution that in times of war 
or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in 
protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that 
in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national 
security must not be used to protect governmental actions from 
close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in 
times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, 
legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise 
 
4. In Minoru Yasui’s coram nobis case, the court acceded to the government’s 
request to vacate his conviction and dismiss his petition for relief without 
making any determinations regarding government misconduct—and without 
acknowledging the injustice he suffered.   
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their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and 
prejudices that are so easily aroused. 
Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1420.  
In vacating Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi’s convictions, the 
coram nobis courts joined other governmental institutions in 
recognizing the wrongs committed against Japanese Americans during 
World War II. In 1976, President Ford officially rescinded Executive 
Order 9066, explaining that “[w]e now know what we should have 
known then—not only was *** evacuation wrong, but Japanese-
Americans were and are loyal Americans.” Presidential Proclamation 
4417, “An American Promise,” 41 Fed. Reg. 7714 (Feb. 19, 1976). The 
Executive Branch also recognized the contributions of the three men 
who challenged the military orders. Each one received the Presidential 
Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor: Fred Korematsu 
in 1998, Gordon Hirabayashi in 2012, and Minoru Yasui in 2015. 
In 1983, after extensive hearings and research, the congressionally 
authorized Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of 
Civilians (CWRIC) issued a report concluding that it was not “military 
necessity” that underpinned the mass removal and incarceration 
program, but rather “race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of 
political leadership.” Report of CWRIC, Personal Justice 
Denied 459 (The Civil Liberties Public Education Fund & University 
of Washington Press, 1997). Five years later, Congress passed (and 
President Reagan signed) the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which, on the 
CWRIC’s recommendations, acknowledged the injustice of the removal 
and incarceration program, issued an official apology, and conferred 
symbolic reparations to the survivors of the incarceration centers.   
Most recently, in 2011, the Acting Solicitor General confirmed what 
the coram nobis cases had established decades earlier: This Court’s 
wartime decisions were predicated on lies. “By the time the cases of 
Gordon Hirabayashi and Fred Korematsu reached the Supreme Court, 
[DOJ] had learned of a key intelligence report that undermined the 
rationale behind the internment. *** But the Solicitor General did not 
inform the Court of the report despite warnings *** that failing to alert 
the Court ‘might approximate the suppression of evidence.’ Instead, he 
argued that it was impossible to segregate loyal Japanese Americans 
from disloyal ones.” U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The 
Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment 
Cases (May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-
error-solicitor-generals-mistakes-during-japanese-american-internment-
cases. 
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III. The Government’s Litigation Strategy in this Case Demands this 
Court’s Vigilance. 
The government’s arguments in this case bear a disturbing 
similarity to the arguments this Court accepted in Korematsu, 
Hirabayashi, and Yasui. Defending the military orders in Hirabayashi, 
the government told this Court: 
The classification was not based upon invidious race 
discrimination. Rather, it was founded upon the fact that the 
group as a whole contained an unknown number of persons who 
could not readily be singled out and who were a threat to the 
security of the nation; and in order to impose effective restraints 
upon them it was necessary not only to deal with the entire group, 
but to deal with it at once. Certainly, it cannot be said that such 
a conclusion was beyond the honest judgment, reasonably 
exercised, of those whose duty it was to protect the Pacific Coast 
against attack. 
Gov’t Br. 35, Hirabayashi v. United States, supra (emphasis added). 
Here, the government similarly implores the Court to accept the 
rationale offered and not to look behind the four corners of the 
Presidential Proclamation to ascertain whether the policy is motivated 
by discriminatory animus. “The Proclamation,” the government argues, 
“is explicitly premised on facially legitimate purposes: protecting 
national security and the national interest by preventing entry of 
persons about whom the United States lacks sufficient information to 
assess the risk they pose[.] *** The Proclamation thus amply establishes 
a ‘facially legitimate and bona fide reason’ for its restrictions.’” Gov’t 
Br. 60 (quoting Mandel, 408 U.S. at 770).   
Decades after Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, however, the 
national security justification the government offered for its wartime 
policies was proven false and the real reasons for the military orders—
baseless concerns about disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes—were 
exposed. The government has offered no basis to believe that similar 
revelations about the President’s decision to exclude individuals from 
Muslim-majority countries will not one day come to light. To the 
contrary, the government’s representations and litigation strategy in 
this case only exacerbate that grave concern. 
First, although the government claims that it conducted a 
“worldwide review” to arrive at the decision to deny all immigrant and 
most non-immigrant visas to designated classes, the Proclamation’s text 
offers reason to doubt that the review actually supports the policy. The 
Proclamation indicates that its non-immigrant visa restrictions are “in 
accordance with the recommendations of the Secretary of Homeland 
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Security” based on the worldwide review. Presidential Proclamation, 
§ 1(h)(iii). Notably, the Proclamation does not make the same claim 
with respect to the immigrant visa restrictions. See id. at § 1(h)(ii). 
The government’s references to the worldwide review in its brief are 
similarly delicate. See Gov’t Br. 9-10. 
Second, despite the purported centrality of the worldwide review 
and corresponding report by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
government has gone to great lengths to shield that report from view. 
The government has resisted providing the report to the courts even 
for in camera inspection and has urged the courts not to “consider [its] 
contents” should they decide, over the government’s objections, to 
review the report. See Notice of In Camera Ex Parte Lodging of Report 
Containing Classified Information and Objection to Review or 
Consideration of Report at 4, State of Hawaii v. Trump et al., No. 17-
cv-0050-DKW-KSC, ECF No. 376 (D. Haw. Oct. 13, 2017); Fourth 
Circuit Letter, supra. The government has also aggressively fought 
efforts to release the report publicly, arguing that it is protected from 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) by the 
presidential communications privilege. See, e.g., Brennan Center for 
Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 2, 
2017).5 
Third, echoing the findings in the ONI, FBI and FCC reports 
suppressed in the wartime cases, the limited documents that have come 
to light pertaining to the President’s exclusion decision undermine 
rather than affirm the purported national security justification for the 
ban. Following the first Executive Order suspending the entry of aliens 
from Muslim-majority nations, the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) drafted a report assessing the likelihood that visitors and 
immigrants from those countries would commit acts of terrorism in the 
United States. The report concluded that “citizens of countries affected 
by E.O. 13769 [were] rarely implicated in US-based terrorism” and “few 
of the impacted countries have terrorist groups that threaten the 
West.” Acting Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, DHS, Citizenship 
Likely an Unreliable Indicator of Terrorist Threat to the United States 
(Feb. 2017) (capitalization removed), 
 
5. In FOIA litigation, the government has released indexes describing the 
contents of the pages it continues to withhold. Those indexes indicate that 
the appendices for the reports on the “worldwide” review are only a few 
pages long. See Letter to Judge Paul Gardephe from AUSA Christopher 
Connolly, Brennan Center for Justice v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 17-cv-7520 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2018), ECF No. 31. Because the reports’ appendices 
supposedly provide detail as to why the targeted countries’ vetting systems 
are inadequate, the paltry page count offers additional reason for skepticism 
that the reports provide a sufficient justification for the President’s policy.   
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https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3474730/DHS-
intelligence-document-on-President-Donald.pdf. In other words, little 
more than six months before the Secretary of Homeland Security 
produced a report that purports to justify the visa-denial policy, the 
Department concluded that the very individuals affected were unlikely 
to pose a threat to the United States if permitted to enter. 
Parallels to the government’s actions in the wartime cases have not 
been lost on the lower courts. Before enjoining the President’s 
Proclamation, the District Court of Maryland asked the government: 
“How is this different than Korematsu where [the United States] relied 
on an executive order by the President and many years after the fact 
it was determined that there was information within the Justice 
Department that contradicted representations made to the Court”? 
Prelim. Inj. Hr’g Tr. at 50, Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, et al. v. 
Trump, et al., No. 17-cv-00361-TDC (D. Md. Oct. 16, 2017), ECF No. 
217. Even when confronted with that direct question, the government 
refused to assure the court that the DHS report entirely supports the 
policies contained in the Proclamation. See id. at 51 (“Your Honor, I’m 
not going to speak to the contents of the report.”). Indeed, the 
government disclaimed any obligation to tell the court whether advisors 
to the President disagreed that his exclusion decision was necessary. 
See id. at 52 (“I do not think we either have the obligation or should 
be asked about whether there were disagreements among presidential 
advisors in the report and whether—what one describes as an 
inconsistency of what one agency thought or what another agency 
thought.”).   
The government’s refusal to produce the report underlying the 
Proclamation, or even to assure the courts that its contents do not 
undermine the President’s policy, offers ample reason for skepticism 
that the decision to exclude certain classes was based on a credible 
assessment of the national security threat those individuals pose. The 
dubious nature of the government’s asserted justification raises the 
question whether, like in Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui, the 
decision was motivated by more nefarious considerations. 
 
*  * * 
 
During World War II, this Court’s refusal to probe the 
government’s claim that military necessity justified the mass removal 
and incarceration of Japanese Americans made it unwittingly complicit 
in the government’s deception. The Court’s blank-check treatment of 
the Executive Branch’s wartime policies—underscored by its repeated 
refusal to confront the most grievous aspects of those policies or to 
acknowledge their racist underpinnings—allowed the wrongs inflicted 
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on Japanese Americans to continue unabated for years, and allowed the 
government to avoid accountability for its egregious misconduct for 
decades.   
Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are powerful reminders not 
only of the need for constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental 
values, but also of the essential role of the courts as a check on abuses 
of government power, especially during times of national and 
international stress. Rather than repeat the failures of the past, this 
Court should repudiate them and affirm the greater legacy of those 
cases: Blind deference to the Executive Branch, even in areas in which 
decision-makers must wield wide discretion, is incompatible with the 
protection of fundamental freedoms. Meaningful judicial review is an 
essential element of a healthy democracy.   
Consistent with those principles, this Court should reject the 
government’s invitation to abdicate its critical role in our constitutional 
system, subject the President’s exclusion decision to searching judicial 
scrutiny, and stand—as Gordon Hirabayashi, Minoru Yasui, and Fred 
Korematsu did—as a bulwark against governmental action that 
undermines core constitutional values.  
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the decisions 
below. 
 
 
